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Abstract: 
This article presents a novel analytical account of the relationship between deliberation and 
representation by reconstructing the specific institutional logics that guide deliberative action 
in parliaments. In contrast to the dominant generalised paradigm in empirical deliberation 
research it develops a contextualised-systemic approach. This article argues that the 
parliamentary context is characterised by a tension between two equally legitimate 
institutional logics: a discursive one, institutionalised through parliamentary procedures, and a 
positional one, constituted by relations of representation. The resulting theoretical model links 
the specific institutional and situational conditions to different forms and functions of 
deliberation. Depending on the specific balance between both logics deliberation fulfils 
functions of either integration or contestation. The model is applied to a comparative analysis 
of different cases of parliaments demonstrating how this account can advance both the 
comparative analysis of deliberation in representative institutions and the development of 
deliberative democracy after the systemic turn. 
 















The relationship between representation and deliberation is fraught with tension. On the one 
hand, there is no deliberation without representation. For deliberative encounters to be 
meaningfully interactive, they require some limitation of the number of actors involved, 
which makes deliberation ‘inherently representative’ (Bohman 2012, 76). On the other hand, 
if deliberation changes minds and positions as deliberative democratic theorists expect a 
potential problem arises: people who did not directly participate in the process do not have 
reasons stemming from deliberation itself to accept the outcome. This has been referred to as 
the ‘scale problem’ of deliberative democracy (Parkinson 2006, 5). 
 
There are different approaches to tackle this complicated relationship. While research in 
comparative politics often neglects the deliberative dimension of electoral representative 
institutions (cf. Bächtiger 2014; Quirk and Bendix 2011), deliberative democratic theorists 
tend to shift their attention to non-electoral forms of representation (e.g. Dryzek and 
Niemeyer 2008; Kuyper 2016). Although the latter strand of research has produced important 
insights for the normative assessment of different forms of representation, we still lack a clear 
analytical understanding of how and under what conditions practices of deliberation and 
claims for representation facilitate or limit each other in different institutional contexts, be 
they formal/electoral or informal/non-electoral. 
 
That is the point of departure for this article, which presents a novel, contextualised and 
systemic account for analysing the relationship between deliberation and representation in 
parliaments. The basic argument is that parliamentary deliberation takes place between the 
poles of two democratically legitimate institutional logics: a discursive one and a positional 
one. Relations of representation constitute a positional logic that fosters a commitment to 
positions developed before a deliberative encounter. By contrast, the discursive logic is 
institutionalised through procedures and norms of mutual justification that principally implies 
openness for changing positions. Different parliamentary arenas and conflict situations are 
characterised by a specific balance between both logics, which in turn determines the form 
deliberation takes, its dynamics, and the functions it fulfils. 
 
Parliaments are particularly suited for studying this dynamic relationship. With their 
sophisticated coupling of representation, deliberation, and binding collective decision-making, 
parliaments play a unique role within democratic political systems. One might say that by 
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combining different phases of deliberation in diverse arenas with varying degrees of publicity, 
parliaments build a deliberative system of their own. Given the systemic turn deliberative 
democratic theory has recently taken (Mansbridge et al. 2012), much can be learned from 
deliberation in parliamentary institutions. By focusing on the specific institutional logics in 
which parliamentary deliberation is embedded we gain fine-grained analytical tools that may 
help to understand the relationship between representation and deliberation in other contexts 
as well. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: after critically reviewing the research on parliamentary 
deliberation in the next section, it argues that currently dominant generalised approaches to 
parliamentary deliberation should be complemented by a contextualised approach, which is 
detailed in three steps. The first is to build a context-sensitive concept of deliberation that 
enables us to identify the phenomenological and functional differentiation of deliberation in 
diverse settings. More specifically, the paper argues that an analytical definition should focus 
on the implicit rules that guide deliberation as a communicative practice and not on specific 
ethical motives of actors. The second step is to explain how the two institutional logics are 
constituted and why they stand in tension with each other. The third step is to introduce an 
analytic model that captures the conditions, processes, and functions of parliamentary 
deliberation. The model links the contextual institutional logics – mediated through the 
specific character of the respective political conflict – to the diverse practices of deliberation 
and to their potential functions. Typical deliberative functions range between the poles of 
integration and contestation. 
 
This model will be applied to the comparative analysis of parliamentary deliberation with a 
focus on two levels. On the parliamentary level, I draw on insights from a case study on the 
German federal parliament. On the political system level, I compare the deliberative profiles 
of three cases (the German Bundestag, the US House of Representatives, and the European 
Parliament) that represent three distinct types of legislature. The article concludes with 
implications of the study for both empirical research on deliberation in representative settings 





2. Empirical research on parliamentary deliberation: the generalised approach 
As Mansbridge et al. (2012) have argued, rather than looking at diverse sites of deliberation in 
isolation a systemic approach is needed that takes into account their interdependencies and 
respective functions for entire deliberative systems. Despite this plea, generalised approaches 
to the analysis of deliberation in parliaments are dominating the research agenda. As a result, 
the characteristic institutional embeddedness of parliamentary deliberation remains 
understudied on at least two levels: first, the specific role of deliberation within parliaments, 
and, second, the particular functions of parliaments in democratic systems as a whole. 
Consequently, empirical research has yet to fully account for this contextual specificity of 
parliamentary deliberation. 
 
Parliamentary deliberation has not figured prominently in empirical deliberation research.1 
Two pioneering studies that applied variants of Habermas’ theory of deliberative politics to 
the analysis of parliaments arrived at sceptical conclusions. Based on a comparative analysis 
of discussions on the regulation of stem cell research in Germany, Landwehr and Holzinger 
(2010) concluded that a citizen’s conference demonstrated high degrees of deliberation while 
the plenary debate in the German Federal Parliament lacked any deliberative quality: it was 
not discursive and had little impact on preference transformation. 
 
While that study suggests an absence of deliberative quality in German parliamentary debates, 
a seminal study by Steiner et al. (2004) finds evidence of variation in the quality of 
parliamentary deliberation in different political systems. To arrive at this conclusion, Steiner 
et al. (2004) applied their Discourse Quality Index (DQI)2 to parliamentary deliberation in 
Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although both studies 
provide new and valuable insights into the causal relationships between conditional factors, 
the quality of deliberation, and its effects, at least three interrelated critiques can be levelled. 
First, they do not take into account the functional differentiation of parliamentary 
deliberation:  parliamentary decision-making proceeds through diverse arenas (party group 
meetings, factional and inter-factional circles, committee meetings, hearings, plenary debates) 
that all contribute to the overall result by fulfilling different functions. Second, both studies 
undervalue the critical dimension of deliberation (Dryzek 2000; White and Farr 2012): its 
potential to challenge dominant positions. Emphasising this critical potential could respond to 
theoretical critics like Mouffe (2005), Sanders (1997) and Young (2000) who argue that 
deliberation is too much oriented towards consensus and the status quo, but both of the 
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parliamentary studies privilege consensual behaviour over contestation by focusing on either 
the degree of unification or coordinative adjustment of positions as the appropriate outcome 
of deliberation. Third, and related to the previous points, there is a need to focus on 
interaction rather than on individual speech acts in order to capture discourse as an 
interactional phenomenon – one that can only partially and indirectly be identified in 
individual communicative acts. 
 
These strands of research, which I will refer to as the ‘ethical-evaluative’ paradigm, can be 
complemented with an alternative, contextualised-systemic approach to the analysis of 
parliamentary deliberation. The ethical-evaluative approach is characterised by the 
benchmarking application of a generalised measure to diverse contextual settings, by focusing 
on individual ethical behaviour, and by privileging the consensus building potential of 
deliberation. In contrast, the contextualised-systemic approach aims to account for the 
functional specificity of deliberation in diverse settings by incorporating existing deliberative 
practices and considering their diverse functions. 
 
Limitations of the ethical-evaluative paradigm have been acknowledged. For instance, 
Bächtiger et al. (2010) identify ‘blind spots’ in approaches like the DQI. As a solution, they 
propose a sequential approach to evaluating deliberation that allows for the possibility that the 
different ‘virtues’ of deliberation can emerge in different phases of the deliberative process 
(Bächtiger et al. 2010). However, the sequential approach is basically just an extension of the 
DQI because it locates alternative forms of communication (e.g. storytelling) at lower points 
on the evaluative measurement scale. These alternative forms are understood as ‘non-rational’ 
complements to proper deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 54). Thus, a functional 
differentiation of deliberation as such is still not considered. 
 
In another extension of the DQI, Lord and Tamvaki (2013) acknowledge that purely 
consensual behaviour is only partially appropriate for the parliamentary context. To fully 
assess the justificatory function of plenary debates, they add theoretical indicators that 
recognise that deliberation may legitimately adopt a controversial or adversarial character. 
Despite this, the study still suffers from some of the limitations of the ethical-evaluative 
paradigm. It focuses on individual conduct in plenary debates without sufficient reference to 
the interdependencies of deliberative acts within the parliamentary process and to the 
institutional specificities that might trigger peculiar dynamics of parliamentary deliberation. 
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Thus, we need to go one step further in order to take into account the institutional specificity 
and functional embeddedness of parliaments. 
 
 
3. An analytical framework for a contextualised approach 
The underlying assumption of the contextualised-systemic approach is that deliberation is not 
only a theoretical concept, but also an observable political practice that takes on diverse forms 
in different contexts. Following this supposition, empirical research on deliberation needs to 
do two things. First, it needs to develop an analytical concept that captures the theoretical core 
of deliberation while remaining sensitive to diverse empirical manifestations of deliberative 
practice. Second, research on deliberation should reconstruct the specific institutional contexts 
in which the deliberative practices being investigated are embedded and which also provide 
the mechanisms that produce the specific dynamics of parliamentary deliberation. I address 
the first need in the following section and then turn to the second requirement. 
 
3.1 Towards an analytical concept of deliberation 
In the literature on deliberative democracy, the concept of deliberation is regularly connected 
to normative assumptions regarding the ethical orientation of deliberating actors (e.g. 
Chambers 2003, 309). I argue, however, that we should not include a specific ethical quality 
of actor’s motivations into a conceptual definition of deliberation,3 because this produces 
blind spots in our analytical tools that hinder us from capturing important aspects of 
deliberative practice, such as more contentious forms of deliberation. Furthermore, focusing 
on individual motives tends to isolate speech acts from the context of deliberative interaction, 
which in turn is important to understand the potential communicative dynamic and resulting 
quality of deliberation. As I will show below, actor motivations will legitimately vary across 
contexts. In this way, they cause variations in deliberative practices that despite their diversity 
can comply with basic assumptions outlined in deliberative theory. Therefore, I suggest 
defining deliberation as a practice of communication not characterised by a distinct ethical 
orientation of actors but constituted by certain implicit rules that normatively constrain actors 




Jon Elster’s (1999) distinction between arguing and bargaining provides a good starting point 
for clarifying these rules of deliberative practices. Relating to this distinction, Habermas 
writes: 
Arguing and bargaining are practices that force participants to comply with certain conditions 
of communication. Anyone who engages in discourse must operate with pieces of information 
and reasons that may convince an impartial third party, even if the speaker is thereby pursuing 
strategic ulterior motives. And anyone who seeks compromises […] must have at his disposal 
means and incentives with which he can influence the other party by threatening or rewarding. 
(2007, 422; own translation, emphasis added) 
Thus, the implicit conditions or rules of deliberation are to be seen, at least to some extent, as 
independent of individual motivations, and as coming into play as soon as someone engages 
in this specific mode of communication. The individual motive can be mutual understanding, 
but it can also be strategic considerations if the actors play by the rules of deliberation – i.e. 
according to its argumentative logic – which then allows us to identify the resulting 
communicative interactions as deliberative practices. 
 
This conceptual distinction is especially relevant for parliamentary contexts. Communicative 
processes in parliaments are embedded in a strategic environment due to the competitive 
relation among the party groups. This is not to say that strategic embeddedness renders 
deliberation impossible a priori. One could argue that partisan competition importantly drives 
and dynamises deliberative justification by reciprocally challenging differing conceptions of 
the common good (White and Ypi 2011; cf. Urbinati 2000). 
 
In any case, deliberation has to follow the logic of argumentation in order to avoid 
communication breakdowns, such as the withdrawal of communication partners. Hence, while 
deliberation can appear with different individual motives of actors, an alignment with the 
specific implicit rules of the game is required, whenever actors want to effectively participate 
in deliberative practices (Habermas 2005). These rules demand the give and take of reasons, 
and a speaker must accept that other speakers will provide counter-arguments against his or 
her validity claims. 
 
Of course, this does not mean that engagement in deliberative interaction automatically 
triggers proper arguments for and against validity claims, and only that. Depending on their 
motives, actors will have incentives to pretend to argue and simultaneously try to circumvent 
the justification requirement by resorting to ad hominem arguments, by agenda shifting, by 
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reframing, etc. However, the implicit rules of deliberative interaction provide the mechanism 
for critically scrutinising and contesting such moves by the other communication partners, 
judging them against the criteria of truth, rightness, and sincerity, for example (Habermas 
1987, 376). Thus, engagement in deliberation does not so much force actors to be authentic 
and sincere in their arguments, but rather to accept that their statements and arguments be 
judged according to the norms of authenticity and sincerity. This increases the chance that the 
outcome of deliberation will be less influenced by manipulative aims than any individual 
speech act might be. 
 
Having acknowledged that the same communicative logic can coincide with diverse 
motivations we can conclude that deliberation may appear in different phenomenological 
variants due to different motivations. Along these lines, we can distinguish different action 
orientations (cooperative, competitive, confrontational) that initiate diverse forms of arguing 
(Saretzki 2009, 163). Whereas cooperation is a motive that constitutes an orientation towards 
the integration of divergent points of view, confrontation motivates an orientation towards the 
contestation of competing positions. 
 
Deliberation encompasses those modes of communication that use argumentation. Pure 
bargaining would generally be excluded from the conceptual definition of deliberation, but 
since we can interpret arguing and bargaining semantically as non-symmetrical and non-
exclusive conceptual opposites, there are also hybrid forms of communication occupying a 
grey zone of overlapping membership along the continuum between both ideal-typical poles 
(see Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 162-167; cf. Warren and Mansbridge 2016). 
 
In short, the first analytic step conceptualized deliberation as a communicative practice that is 
guided by the implicit rules of argumentative exchange. Within these constraints, deliberation 
can take diverse forms ranging from cooperative to rather confrontational modes. The form, 
dynamic and subsequent function of deliberation depends on action orientations that vary with 
contextual conditions. These contexts and their relationship to deliberative practices will be 
the object of the next analytic steps. 
 
3.2 The parliamentary context: Conflicting institutional logics 
According to the concept of deliberation outlined here, deliberation is a practice of 
communication that exerts causal influence by constraining and enabling the behaviour of 
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those engaged in interactions. At the same time, however, the actual motives of actors as well 
as the forms, dynamics and functions of deliberation can vary across shifting contexts. If we 
exclude actor motives from the definition of deliberation, then we can treat them as part of the 
incentives and constraints that different contexts provide. 
 
This requires that the institutional and situational context of communicative interaction be 
carefully assessed. In line with neo-institutionalist reasoning, institutions forge and stabilise a 
horizon of orientation for social action. The guiding assumption of the approach presented 
here is that the parliamentary context is characterised by a tension between two institutional 
logics4: a discursive one and a positional one. These logics provide partly-conflicting 
guidelines for members of parliament. 
 
For Habermas (1996, 307), parliaments are traditionally designed to follow a discursive logic. 
Decisions cannot be made immediately after a motion is brought into the legislative process, 
but only after a phase of deliberation in plenary and committee meetings. This is the case 
regardless of the possibility that clear majorities for and against a proposal exist from the 
outset. Procedures are structured to permit a plurality of voices from all perspectives and in a 
consecutive manner, which fosters alternating arguments for minority and majority positions. 
Finally, decisions have to be justified towards the public interest. In these ways, the process of 
decision-making is decelerated and left open to critical reflection. Moreover, members of 
parliament have, in principle, an independent mandate which means that they can change their 
positions as often and as drastically as they deem necessary. Although this freedom is seldom 
used due to party discipline, it provides parliamentarians with a formal autonomy that allows 
them to demand justifications for all decisions they do not immediately agree with. 
 
However, a positional logic is institutionalised in parliaments as well, related to established 
political positions and based on relations of representation. According to Saward a relation of 
representation is constituted by the making of a representation claim and its acceptance by a 
respective audience (Saward 2010, 48). A claim for democratic representation to be 
acceptable requires that claimants align themselves with the norm of responsiveness (Pitkin 
1967, 209) which is institutionalised through mechanisms of authorization and accountability 
(Urbinati and Warren 2008, 396). Thus, representatives are constrained in their political 





In the parliamentary context, we find representative relations in two key respects. First, 
members of parliament represent their electoral constituencies. Second, they represent their 
party group within the parliament. For instance, within the bodies of the parliamentary 
process – plenum and committees – members tend to stand for the positions of their party 
group. The degree to which representatives are bound by the positions of their groups differs 
depending on group cohesion and discipline. While cohesion and discipline are generally 
expected to be strongest when there is a clear connection between the majority in parliament 
and the government, it might be lower in presidential systems where the government is not 
directly dependent on the stability of its party in parliament (Sieberer 2006, 152). The 
positional logic is further institutionalised in certain rights and privileges of party groups. 
And, as in other relations of representation, the logic is reinforced by normative expectations: 
representatives are judged by those they represent according to how well they pushed their 
original position.  
 
The two logics stand in structural tension with each other. Deliberation demands that actors be 
willing to engage in the process of arguing and justification. This implies openness to 
changing one’s stance in the face of convincing reasons. By contrast, relationships of 
representation demand that pre-established positions pass through the decision-making 
process with as little changes as possible. Here, the output is usually judged by those 
represented according to how well it meets their original expectation or at least how closely 
changes match their preferences. 
 
This structural tension corresponds with the ‘scale problem’ of deliberative democracy 
(Parkinson 2006). According to the scale problem, deliberation requires representation, but if 
representatives leave their original positions there is no reason – stemming from deliberation 
itself – to acknowledge the change for those who have not participated in the process. I 
hypothesise that the positional logic is more pronounced in contexts with clear majorities and 
strong party groups that have a high degree of internal cohesion and discipline because, both 
majorities and oppositions will not feel the need to leave their position in order to win each 
other’s support. Along similar lines, I hypothesise that the more intense and consequential 
intra-group deliberation is, the less intense and consequential inter-group deliberation will be 
because the effort put into the internal position building sets a strong incentive not to leave it 




It is important to note that this structural tension argument does not question the democratic 
legitimacy of either of the two logics. On the contrary, their legitimacy is buttressed by the 
specificities of parliamentary contexts. Whereas the discursive logic legitimises decisions 
arrived at through rational justification and argumentative engagement, the positional logic 
legitimises decisions based on public and partisan representation rooted in democratic 
elections and which, in turn, can be viewed as the result of deliberative processes about party 
programs and personnel in the public sphere (Habermas 2005, 390). Programmatic positions 
are to be understood as the articulation of the will of either a majority or minority of the 
people. 
 
3.3 A theoretical model of parliamentary deliberation 
I now synthesise the considerations regarding the concept und context of (parliamentary) 
deliberation in a theoretical model. As summarised in Figure 1, the model includes three 
dimensions: (a) the initial institutional and situational conditions, (b) the forms and practices 
of deliberation, and (c) their potential functions (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model of parliamentary deliberation. 
 
To outline the conditions of parliamentary deliberation, the model adopts a neo-institutionalist 
perspective for understanding institutional contexts (a). In this perspective, actors adopt 
formal and informal institutional conventions by conforming either to a ‘logic of 
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appropriateness’ or a ‘logic of consequentiality’ (March and Olsen 1996). In the 
parliamentary context, institutional conditions are constituted by the tension between the 
aforementioned discursive and positional logics. Importantly, these logics are implemented in 
specific roles, rules, and resources. Whereas roles provide actor-specific and functional 
orientations, rules offer guidelines for situational contexts. Certain resources are also 
institutionalised or standardised to guide actors in their planning (e.g. time, expertise, and 
social relationships). Empirically, we should be able to identify the potentially conflicting 
orientations for social interaction that the discursive and positional logics create across roles, 
rules and resources. For example, as members of specific committees, parliamentarians often 
take on the roles of policy experts and of representatives of the respective party group at the 
same time. The former is likely to support a discursive logic, because it requires openness to 
technical or field-specific arguments. The latter is likely to stress a positional logic by staying 
in line with the position taken by the party group s/he represents. 
 
Dovetailing with the institutional context is the situational context. This aspect of the 
conditions shaping parliamentary deliberation is characterised by the structure of the issue 
under consideration. In the literature on deliberation, two common dimensions undergird the 
issue structure: the type of conflict and the degree of polarisation. For the first dimension, a 
common typology is the distinction between conflicts over facts, over values, and of interests 
(Holzinger 2005): Value conflicts can be expected to enhance an inflexibility of positions, 
whereas conflicts over facts might be more accessible to discursive clarification and conflicts 
of interests prone to be tackled by bargaining. The second dimension of issue structure relates 
to the degree of polarisation (Steiner et al. 2004, 88-89). I will use the term polarisation 
potential in order to highlight the fact that polarisation is endogenous to the process. It can 
increase or decrease depending on other factors, such as the public salience of an issue. A 
higher polarisation potential will encourage the positional logic by widening the room for 
confrontation. 
 
The model assumes that the issue structure interacts with the balance between the institutional 
logics by influencing the interpretation of the situation by the actors who then stress either the 
discursive or the positional roles, rules, and resources. 
 
Turning to the process dimension of the model (b), parliamentary practices of communication 
are executed by the members of parliament based on their assessment of intersecting 
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institutional and situational conditions. Practices mediate between institutions and concrete 
situations by providing a range of collectively recognised patterns of action that actors can use 
to address current challenges (Rüb 2009). Parliamentary practices can encompass different 
forms of deliberation as well as other forms of communication. Notably, deliberation may 
include forms of arguing and hybrids between arguing and bargaining, while other forms of 
communication will include pure forms of bargaining. Thus, forms and practices of 
communication can stand closer to either the discursive or the positional logic of the 
institutional context. 
 
As some degree of competition among parties exists in all parliaments, it is safe to assume 
that parliamentary actors strategically evaluate the institutional and situational context before 
engaging in communicative exchanges. However, in such highly institutionalised realms, the 
choice of practices is restricted to the available, legitimate forms of communication. In short, 
even if parliamentary actors think strategically, they are still bound to follow a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. In this case, communication will be based either on the discursive or 
positional logic or a combination of both. 
 
In concrete situations, actors will make judgements about the balance between discursive and 
positional logics and the issue structure, and will develop expectations about other 
discussants. Based on such strategic assessments of the context, actors can adopt two ideal-
typical deliberative orientations: towards cooperation or towards contestation. While the 
cooperative approach will imply more conciliatory forms of deliberation, the contentious 
approach will result into more confrontational. The stronger the discursive logic, the more 
likely the cooperative orientation will emerge. The stronger the positional logic, the more 
likely the orientation towards contestation will emerge. 
 
Turning to the third dimension (c) of the theoretical model, the functions of parliamentary 
deliberation can be located on a scale between integration and contestation. Whereas the 
former closes the deliberative process, the latter re-opens it. These functions are to be fulfilled 
within the parliamentary procedure and for the political system as a whole. The functional 
performance of parliaments hinges on two contextual variables that condition the mode of 
deliberation and its effects: (1) the issue structure and (2) the balance of the institutional 
logics. This leads to the following hypotheses. All other things being equal, issues with a high 
polarization potential and conflicts over values will foster confrontational modes of 
14 
 
deliberation. Here, deliberation will fulfil contestation functions – if the process of 
communication does not break down. On the other extreme, issues with a low polarization 
potential in conflicts over facts will foster integrative modes of deliberation that are likely to 
fulfil integrative functions. 
 
If we keep the issue structure constant and focus on the second contextual variable, the 
balance of institutional logics, the model offers another set of predictions. The more the 
discursive logic dominates the parliamentary setting, the greater the chances are that 
cooperative modes of deliberation will fulfil integrative functions. If the positional logic is 
dominating, deliberation is likely to break down or to be substituted by bargaining. Thus, I 
assume that deliberation can only be effective if the discursive logic has at least a minimal 
degree of influence. If the positional and discursive logics are in equal balance, 




4. Comparing forms and functions of parliamentary deliberation 
The next step is to apply the analytic framework to an illustrative analysis of parliamentary 
deliberation. This demonstrates how the contextualised-systemic approach produces results 
and insights that differ from and add to those generated by the generalised ethical-evaluative 
paradigm. This section starts with a comparison of issue structures and arenas within one 
parliament belonging to the parliamentary system type, then turns to a comparison of 
deliberative functions of different types of parliaments for their respective political system. 
 
4.1. Comparing issue structures and parliamentary arenas 
The German Bundestag is a typical case of a parliamentary system in which there is a clear-
cut division and dualism between the governing majority and the opposition (Lijphart 1992). 
As hypothesised above, this fact is expected to accentuate the positional logic within the 
parliamentary setting. Nevertheless, the question remains how strongly the institutionalised 
discursive logic will guide the process. 
 
Focusing first on variations in the issue structure, case study evidence6 shows that deliberative 
practices and dynamics clearly differ depending on the type of conflict and degree of 
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polarization. Highly polarized and ideological topics narrow the space for an effective 
exchange of arguments by fostering the positional logic of the parliamentary process as 
expected. In the most extreme cases of ideological polarization members of parliament even 
report communicative breakdowns in committee sessions – as for example in 2010 during a 
conflict over the prolongation of the runtime of nuclear power plants, when substantial 
debates were substituted by second order disputes over the rules of procedure and by mutual 
accusations of eroding the parliamentary process (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2010, 7159-7166). 
 
However, even if conflicts are ideologically polarized, the discursive logic of procedural rules 
still pushes actors to engage in deliberative encounters in most instances. In addition, 
members of parliament report that committee deliberation is normally characterized by a high 
level of respect based on the mutual recognition of their roles as policy experts that 
strengthens the discursive logic of the setting. However, this does not mean that the positional 
logic will be completely overridden, at least not in the formal arenas of decision-making. In 
such, rather common cases, both logics are equally balanced. The result is the adoption of 
confrontational modes of deliberation by the actors that aim at mutual contestation more than 
consensual integration of positions, although arguments are still designed to convince 
opponents. By contrast, issues framed as conflicts over facts with less salience for partisan 
polarization regularly leave room for cooperative deliberation between members of different 
party groups. This cooperation is supported by a shared role as policy experts, by social 
resources of professional trust and informal relationships that can result in positional 
accommodation. 
 
If we keep the second dimension, the issue structure, constant, we can trace variations in 
balancing institutional logics along the parliamentary decision-making process. Deliberation 
within the German Bundestag takes place in intra- as well as inter-party arenas (both formal 
and informal) that typically vary in their balancing of the discursive and positional logic. 
Backed up by a robust party discipline as well as by far-reaching rights of parliamentary party 
groups, the positional logic turns out to be strong in encounters between opposition and 
governing majority. On the one hand, this condition limits the possibility of reaching inter-
party consensual agreements through deliberation in parliament. As an unwritten rule, 
motions from the opposition are regularly rejected by the majority and vice versa. On the 
other hand, we find evidence that intra-party deliberation plays an important role in the 
construction of positions of the respective party group. Here, conflicts that are based on 
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different policy perspectives are tackled not only through bargaining but also by arguing (cf. 
Schöne 2010, 150-151). 
 
However, as expected, the intensity of the process of intra-party deliberation further limits 
openness to changing party positions in inter-party deliberation, because of an implicit rule 
that potential modifications would have to be discussed and confirmed in the party group 
again. Committee members are drawn into a conflict between legitimate roles: as policy 
experts, they might be open to the arguments from their colleagues from other parties, but as 
representatives of their own party they have to execute the positional decisions of their 
groups, which in turn are regularly based on deliberative processes.7 
 
Although committee members do not expect committee or plenary deliberation to change 
their or their opponent’s positions within in process, they still feel compelled by the formal 
and informal deliberative rules that constitute the discursive logic of the setting to justify their 
own positions and their rejection of others’. Moreover, they see a clear difference between 
(normally non-public) committee deliberation and public floor debate: while the first one still 
mainly addresses the participants of the internal decision-making process, the latter is in the 
first instance directed to the broader public. At the same time, they value floor debates highly, 
not only because they allow them to justify their own point of view to an outside audience but 
also because they see the chance to influence future agenda-setting and position-building 
processes by contesting competing political positions (Schäfer 2017, 233-243). 
 
These results suggest a functional differentiation of deliberation within the German federal 
parliament: Whereas in intra-party arenas deliberation contributes to the building of common 
positions (the integrative function), in inter-party arenas deliberation has primarily the 
function of justifying own and of contesting opponent’s positions. While the parliamentary 
context leaves some room for less ideologically polarized issues to be informally and 
cooperatively discussed among members of different party groups, in the formal arenas and 
especially in plenary debates the contestation function clearly dominates. This, however, can 
contribute to position building within parties and the broader public in the long run. 
 
4.2. Comparing deliberative profiles of parliaments 
Since parliamentary deliberation is a central element of the larger political process in society, 
the next question is whether we can also identify characteristic deliberative profiles of 
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parliaments that are associated with a tendency towards either integration or contestation for 
the respective political system. In order to illustrate what the contextualised model implies for 
such a comparison of parliaments, this section looks at three different cases that vary in their 
conditions for the positional logic: the German Bundestag with its clear-cut majorities and a 
high degree of factional cohesion; the US House of Representatives with its less clear 
majorities and rather low party group cohesion (Owens 2003, 18); and the European 
Parliament with its flexible, shifting majorities of diverse coalitions and a neither strong nor 
really weak cohesion of the party groups due to its transnational character and its lack of 
effective links to the executive (Hix and Høyland 2013). The positional logic is likely to be 
strongest in the German case, weakest in the American case, the European Parliament lying in 
between.  
 
Regarding the discursive logic, we can for the sake of analytical simplification assume 
roughly equal initial conditions due to similar parliamentary procedures in the three cases. If 
one brackets off the fact of issue structuration for the moment and directly compares the 
hypothetical performance of the three parliaments in fulfilling deliberative functions, one 
would expect to find the contestation function (anchored in a confrontational mode of 
deliberation) to be strongest in the Bundestag and weakest in the House of Representatives. 
By contrast, one might predict the House to be strongest and the Bundestag weakest with 
regard to integrative functions (anchored in integrative modes of deliberation), with the 
European Parliament falling between the two extremes. 
 
This positioning of the cases is relevant for the relation of bargaining and arguing as well. The 
House of Representatives is the most promising candidate for bargaining as an alternative to 
arguing because bargaining requires that negotiation partners have veto power and the ability 
to offer something to each other. This is not the case when we have clear-cut majorities and 
high party group cohesion, such as in the Bundestag. Here, the majority normally does not 
need the consent of the minority and the opposition has few opportunities to trade on 
influence. This leaves arguing as the primary mode for addressing disagreement. In the 
American case, where majorities are less clear and party group cohesion less stable, 
bargaining can be an attractive alternative to arguing in order to tackle conflicts both within 
and between party groups. Individual members of Congress can offer to shift their support to 
strengthen or weaken the veto power of their party groups. The European Parliament 
generally provides better conditions for bargaining than the German case but also somewhat 
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worse conditions than the American case. This is because shifting majorities and only 
moderately strong party group coherence blur the lines between supporters and opponents of 
positions. This makes it hard to stipulate veto positions and, in turn, makes bargaining less 
attractive than in the American case. This suggests that high party group cohesion and clear 
majorities foster confrontational forms of deliberation, whereas low party group cohesion and 
less clear majorities promote cooperative forms of deliberation and bargaining. 
 
This hypothetical analysis demonstrates how we can construct deliberative profiles for diverse 
types of parliaments. This is not to suggest that deliberative profiles are monolithic. Of 
course, internal variation will occur as issue structures change and the polarization potential 
evolves through the parliamentary process itself. Moreover, parliaments can fulfil diverse 
deliberative functions by addressing diverse issues differently. However, these hypotheses do 
reflect overall tendencies or trends in the functional performance of specific parliaments that 
could be tested empirically. 
 
How we value or assess the tendencies of our cases must depend on the character of the larger 
political system in which the respective parliament is embedded. The question, then, is what 
parliamentary deliberation can achieve for the other parts of the democratic system. In the 
German case, a politicising tendency of parliamentary deliberation might counterbalance the 
consensual political culture of the country by bringing issues and arguments onto the political 
agenda that would otherwise be silenced. The American case might systematically profit from 
conciliatory forms of deliberation and negotiation in the House of Representatives, 
ameliorating confrontational deadlocks in the political process that arise from the 
constitutional division of powers between executive and legislative branches. Considering the 
mixed profile of the European case, an integrational tendency in parliamentary deliberation 
could help integrate a political system that encompasses diverse political cultures. A potential 
downside of this consensual functioning of parliamentary deliberation, and one identified for 
the European Union (e.g. Pérez 2013), is that it may be less conducive to the development of 
a political public sphere where the political status quo can be contested. Thus, one could argue 
that the European Parliament sometimes needs more partisan, confrontational modes of 
deliberation that clearly indicate competing political alternatives. 
 
Thus, while research within the framework of the ethical-evaluative paradigm, exemplified by 
Landwehr and Holzinger (2010) and Steiner et al. (2004), produces a rather sceptical 
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diagnosis of deliberative performance of parliaments that identify rather low degrees of 
discourse quality, the contextualised-systemic approach would provide a more balanced base 
for the evaluation of deliberative performance within the political system. The approach not 
only captures the more conciliatory forms and integrative functions, but also the more 
confrontational modes and contestation functions of parliamentary deliberation. In addition, it 
provides the analytical tools to explain the relationship between specific institutional 
configurations, issue structures, and the forms and functions of deliberation across the diverse 




This article has addressed the complicated relationship between deliberation and 
representation by analytically reconstructing the institutional logics embedded in parliaments, 
the major representative institution of liberal democracies. The article takes a critical stance 
towards prevailing approaches to the study of parliamentary deliberation. In contrast to the 
ethical-evaluative paradigm that applies generalised theoretical measures to predominantly 
individual-level behaviour and focuses on consensual effects, it has introduced a 
contextualised-systemic approach that accounts for different conditions, forms and functions 
of parliamentary deliberation. 
 
According to this approach, the parliamentary context of deliberation is undergirded by a 
tension between two democratically legitimated institutional logics. The balance between 
positional and discursive logics and the issue structure of a conflict shape the deliberative 
orientation of the actors, the form of deliberation they adopt, and the subsequent deliberative 
functions. Although a pure positional logic would prevent deliberation from having any 
effect, both logics are important for understanding how deliberation fulfils different 
democratic functions. However, only a combination of those functions can plausibly provide 
legitimacy to collective decisions. Whereas minorities must have recourse to the legitimate 
option of contesting decisions and the possibility of winning the majority in the future, 
majorities can expect the conflict to be legitimately settled for the time being. 
 
The framework was applied to a comparative analysis of parliaments in order to demonstrate 
its analytic potential at a reasonably abstract level, with hypotheses derived for a more 
detailed empirical work. The case of the German Bundestag shows how deliberation follows a 
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functional differentiation in the parliamentary process according to the needs of diverse 
arenas. The comparison of the German case with the US House of Representatives and the 
European Parliament indicates how the framework can be applied to reconstruct deliberative 
profiles of parliaments, and how their deliberative performance can be evaluated in relation to 
the democratic requirements of the surrounding political systems. 
 
Three conclusions can be drawn for future research. First, the approach outlined here suggests 
that empirical deliberation research should take into account more radically the contexts in 
which deliberative practices are embedded, in order to understand their dynamics and 
democratising potential in different contexts. Second, while deliberative democratic theory 
has broadened its focus to the value of non-deliberative forms of communication for the 
deliberative system, it still has to acknowledge and analytically consider the diversity of 
modes of deliberation that promote different valuable democratic functions. Moreover, the 
contextual-systemic approach helps to re-think questions of institutional design for promoting 
specific democratic purposes. Third, although the analysis focuses on parliamentary 
deliberation, insights can be relevant for other representative contexts as well. The 
contextualised-systemic framework provides the conceptual and analytical tools for 
reconstructing the specific interdependence of deliberation and representation not only in 
diverse types of parliaments but also in settings such as mini-publics, parties, NGOs and other 
forums, as long as they both use deliberative practices and make representative claims. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 For an overview of the state of the art, see Bächtiger (2014) and Quirk and Bendix (2011). For an early 
exception, see Uhr (1998). 
2 The DQI inspired a range of consecutive studies that focus on certain aspects of parliamentary deliberation, 
such as the relationships between institutional and cultural factors influencing discourse quality (Bächtiger and 
Hangartner 2010), apply the measurement to other parliaments (Lord and Tamvaki 2013; Roger and Schaal 
2013), or apply it to other settings (Gerber et al. 2014). 
3 Similar claims are made by Thomson (2008, 504) and Warren (2007). 
4 I borrow this term from neo-institutionalist organisation theory (Friedland and Alford 1991), where it is used to 
describe social structures on the macro-level of societies. I apply the term to phenomena on the organisational 
level of the political institutions of the parliament. 
5 Even if we adopt a constructivist conception of representation and acknowledge that responsiveness is not 
always linked to a pre-established position within a constituency but rather yet to be constructed in relation to 
potential future positions (Disch 2011), this process will create representative claims that bind the claimant to the 
expectations of the audience if it shall be accepted. 
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6 Set out in some detail in Schäfer (2017, 127-259). 
7 The representational relationships to the respective electoral constituency can further complicate role 
performance. Generally speaking, representing the regional constituency can support either the discursive or the 
positional logic within the parliamentary process depending on whether constituency interests or perspectives are 
in line or in conflict with party positions (Schäfer 2017, 265). 
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